Nonfiction · 1788
The Federalist Papers
Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, James Madison
The Federalist Papers, first published in 1788, has been pulled into the Bibliomancer archive: the complete text, carefully cleaned and typeset, free to read online. Its editorial introduction is still being prepared.
Contents
- I — General Introduction
- II — Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
- III — The Same Subject Continued
- IV — The Same Subject Continued
- V — The Same Subject Continued
- VI — Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
- VII — The Same Subject Continued
- VIII — The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
- IX — The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
- X — The Same Subject Continued
- XI — The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
- XII — The Utility of the Union in Respect to Revenue
- XIII — Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government
- XIV — Objections to the Proposed Constitution from Extent of Territory Answered
- XV — The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
- XVI — The Same Subject Continued
- XVII — The Same Subject Continued
- XVIII — The Same Subject Continued
- XIX — The Same Subject Continued
- XX — The Same Subject Continued
- XXI — Other Defects of the Present Confederation
- XXII — The Same Subject Continued
- XXIII — The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union
- XXIV — The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
- XXV — The Same Subject Continued
- XXVI — The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
- XXVII — The Same Subject Continued
- XXVIII — The Same Subject Continued
- XXIX — Concerning the Militia
- XXX — Concerning the General Power of Taxation
- XXXI — The Same Subject Continued
- XXXII — The Same Subject Continued
- XXXIII — The Same Subject Continued
- XXXIV — The Same Subject Continued
- XXXV — The Same Subject Continued
- XXXVI — The Same Subject Continued
- XXXVII — Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government
- XXXVIII — The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed
- XXXIX — The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
- XL — The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained
- XLI — General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution
- XLII — The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
- XLIII — The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered)
- XLIV — Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States
- XLV — The Alleged Danger from the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered
- XLVI — The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
- XLVII — The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts
- XLVIII — These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other
- XLIX — Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention
- L — Periodical Appeals to the People Considered
- LI — The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments
- LII — The House of Representatives
- LIII — The Same Subject Continued (The House of Representatives)
- LIV — The Apportionment of Members Among the States
- LV — The Total Number of the House of Representatives
- LVI — The Same Subject Continued (The Total Number of the House of Representatives)
- LVII — The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation
- LVIII — Objection That the Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered
- LIX — Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
- LX — The Same Subject Continued
- LXI — The Same Subject Continued
- LXII — The Senate
- LXIII — The Senate Continued
- LXIV — The Powers of the Senate
- LXV — The Powers of the Senate Continued
- LXVI — Objections to the Power of the Senate to Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered
- LXVII — The Executive Department
- LXVIII — The Mode of Electing the President
- LXIX — The Real Character of the Executive
- LXX — (There are two slightly different versions of No. 70 included here.)
- LXX — The Executive Department Further Considered
- LXXI — The Duration in Office of the Executive
- LXXII — The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered
- LXXIII — The Provision for the Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
- LXXIV — The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive
- LXXV — The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive
- LXXVI — The Appointing Power of the Executive
- LXXVII — The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered
- LXXVIII — The Judiciary Department
- LXXIX — The Judiciary Continued
- LXXX — The Powers of the Judiciary
- LXXXI — The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority
- LXXXII — The Judiciary Continued
- LXXXIII — The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury
- LXXXIV — Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered
- LXXXV — Concluding Remarks
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About this edition
The text is free of copyright. This edition was prepared from an authoritative digitisation, processed by Bibliomancer under its own review protocol; every automated correction is recorded in its transformation log. Rights assessed for CA, EU, GB, US.
Source minds
About the authors
1757–1804 · Enlightenment
Alexander Hamilton (1757–1804) was born on the Caribbean island of Nevis and immigrated to New York as a young man, fighting as an officer in the Continental Army and serving as an aide to George Washington. He wrote more than half of the eighty-five Federalist essays, and as the first Secretary of the Treasury under Washington built the young nation's financial system — a national bank, assumption of state debts, funded public credit. He was fatally wounded in a duel with Vice President Aaron Burr in 1804.
1745–1829 · Romantic
John Jay (1745–1829) was born in New York City, practiced law, and served in both Continental Congresses, as their president in 1778–79. He helped negotiate the Treaty of Paris that ended the Revolutionary War, wrote five of the Federalist essays, and became the first Chief Justice of the United States in 1789. He later negotiated the 1794 treaty with Britain that bears his name and served two terms as Governor of New York, where he signed the state's gradual abolition of slavery into law.
1751–1836 · Romantic
James Madison (1751–1836) was born at Port Conway, Virginia, and studied at what is now Princeton. He drafted much of the Constitution at the 1787 Philadelphia convention and wrote roughly a third of the Federalist essays; authorship of a further dozen, disputed with Hamilton for over a century, has since been credited to him too. He went on to help write the Bill of Rights, serve as Secretary of State under Jefferson, and become the fourth President of the United States (1809–1817), leading the country through the War of 1812.
Adjacent records
